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The year 2002 will go down as a dark year in corporate history,
as scandals involving misleading financial reporting designed to
inflate earnings and hide losses engulfed companies such as Enron,
1
WorldCom, Global Crossing, Tyco, and others. Not surprisingly,
this corporate meltdown has prompted a wealth of commentary
laying the blame on a variety of doorsteps. These include:
decreased enforcement of securities laws due to a combination of
2
legislative barriers to private lawsuits; a lack of resources for the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), coupled with
rulings limiting the liability of indirect participants in securities
3
fraud; the replacement of professionalism with a business-

† Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
1. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy
Rhetoric, Light Reform (and It Might Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003)
(providing an overview of these scandals).
2. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the “Expectations Gap” in Investor
Protection: The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1161-63
(2003).
3. Id. at 1141, 1159-61.
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generating ethos among the partners of major accounting firms;
pressure on securities analysts to make favorable statements about
companies in order to promote investment banking business for
5
the firms employing the analysts; unintended consequences of the
increasing tendency to tie management compensation to stock
6
performance; lack of independence of directors on the board of
7
Enron and other companies; inadequacies in the regulation of
8
9
derivatives; and the irrational behavior of investors themselves.
To this list of whom to blame, I would like to add my own pet
villain, which, I suggest, played at least a non-trivial role in sowing
the seeds for these scandals. My villain is the much noted New
10
York trial court decision in Kamin v. American Express Co. In this
decision, the court held that it was entirely appropriate, under a
doctrine known as the business judgment rule, for the directors of
American Express to cause the company to lose millions of dollars
for the sole purpose of improving reported earnings and thereby
11
maintaining the price at which the company’s stock traded.
Having given such a carte blanche for the practice now referred to
12
as earnings management, it is not surprising that eventually there
would be a cascade of scandals that, at its core, involves
corporations engaging in transactions lacking real substance and
designed simply to improve reported earnings.

4. See, e.g., Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the Role of
Commodification, Independence, and Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L.
REV. 1167, 1168 (2003).
5. See, e.g., Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127, 145-46 (2002).
6. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and
Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1233, 1246-47 (2002).
7. See Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and
Corporate Governance Reform, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855, 871-74 (2003).
8. See Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of “May,”
48 VILL. L. REV. 1245, 1262-80 (2003).
9. See John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron?: A Capsule Social and Economic
History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2004).
10. 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), aff’d, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1976).
11. Id. at 812.
12. See generally Gregory S. Rowland, Note, Earnings Management, the SEC, and
Corporate Governance: Director Liability Arising from the Audit Committee Report, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 168, 207 n.5 (2002) (defining “earnings management”).
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I. THE KAMIN CASE
A. An Overview
Normally, one should be leery of attaching too much
significance to just one New York trial court decision affirmed by
an intermediate appellate court without a written opinion.
Nevertheless, for a substantial fraction of the current generation of
corporate attorneys, the New York trial court’s decision in Kamin
forms part of their essential understanding of the duties of
corporate directors, if, for no other reason, than because of the
opinion’s inclusion in many of the leading casebooks used to teach
13
the subject.
Kamin involved a shareholders’ derivative complaint against
the directors of American Express Co. who had approved
distributing an in-kind dividend. This dividend consisted of shares
of stock in another company (Donaldson, Lufken & Jenrette
(“DLJ”)), which American Express had purchased some years
before as an investment and which had declined substantially in
14
value. The plaintiffs contended the directors should have sold the
DLJ shares at a loss rather than distributing them to the American
15
Express stockholders. In this manner, American Express could
have obtained a capital loss deduction that would have saved
16
American Express around $8 million in taxes.
13. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 536 (8th ed. unabridged 2000); WILLIAM A.
KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY,
PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 316 (5th ed. 2003); JEFFREY D. BAUMAN ET AL.,
CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY: MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 284 (5th ed. 2003); JESSE
H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 198 (5th ed. 2000).
14. Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 809. American Express had acquired the DLJ
stock for almost $30 million, and the stock was only worth $4 million when
distributed. Id.
15. Id. at 809-10.
16. Id. at 811. From a tax planning standpoint, the board’s decision made no
sense. By selling the DLJ stock, American Express evidently could have recognized
a loss of around $25 million. Id. Given the apparent size and nature of American
Express’s other income, and the applicable marginal tax rates, reduction in
American Express’s taxable income by recognizing this loss would have lowered
the company’s tax bill by $8 million. Id. By contrast, with the in-kind dividend,
not only was American Express not able to recognize the $25 million loss on its tax
return, its shareholders received a basis (the sum used in computing gain or loss
for tax purposes on the disposition of property) equal to no more than the
current fair market value of the DLJ stock at the time the shareholders received
the dividend, rather than equal to the higher amount paid by American Express
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The board’s rationale for the in-kind dividend lay in the
17
This treatment
accounting treatment of the transaction.
(although there was some dispute about this) paralleled the tax
treatment. Just as distributing the stock as an in-kind dividend,
rather than selling the shares, avoided recognizing a loss that would
have reduced American Express’s taxable income, it also avoided
recognizing a loss that would have lowered the income reported in
18
the corporation’s published financial statements.
Faced with a
transaction that cost the corporation $8 million, all for the purpose
of avoiding reporting a loss in the company’s published financial
statements, the court granted the defendants’ motions in the
alternative to dismiss the complaint as not stating a cause of action
19
or for summary judgment.
B. Kamin and the Outer Bounds of the Business Judgment Rule
One reason for Kamin’s prominence in corporate law
casebooks is because of its illustration of a rather extreme view of a
doctrine known as the business judgment rule. Different courts
20
define the business judgment rule differently. To some courts,
the so-called rule is simply an overly dramatic way of stating that
directors of a corporation are not liable for decisions the directors
make which go awry, unless the directors breached their duties of
loyalty or care, and that bad results do not, in themselves, show a
21
breach of the duty of care (negligence). To most courts, however,
for the DLJ stock. Id.; see 26 U.S.C. § 301(d) (2004). Hence, the dividend
destroyed the potential for anyone (including American Express’s shareholders)
to obtain the loss deduction on the DLJ stock’s pre-distribution decline in value.
Moreover, the American Express shareholders still had to recognize the dividend
as income, just as they would have had they received cash proceeds from the sale
of the DLJ shares by American Express (e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 301 (2004)) since there is
no indication that American Express owned enough shares in DLJ for a tax-free
spin-off (e.g., 26 U.S.C § 355(a)(1)(A) (2004)). Further, even if the American
Express shareholders had received the DLJ stock in a tax free spin-off, American
Express’s tax savings on recognizing the loss would have far exceeded the total tax
paid by American Express’s shareholders on receiving a $4 million cash dividend
instead of $4 million worth of stock in a tax-free spin-off.
17. Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 815.
20. See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless
Verbiage or Misguided Notion? 67 S. CALIF. L. REV. 287, 290-303 (1994).
21. See, e.g., Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 667, 678 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940). “In
other words, directors are liable for negligence in the performance of their duties.
Not being insurers, directors are not liable for errors of judgment or for mistakes
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the business judgment rule has greater significance. It serves to
insulate the directors from liability for ordinary negligence in
making business decisions, so long as the directors are not in a
conflict of interest in making the decisions. For example, in
Delaware, directors are not liable for a business decision (so long as
the decision does not involve a conflict of interest) unless they
22
made the decision in bad faith or with gross negligence.
Alternatively, other courts have interpreted the rule as limiting the
courts’ ability to review the substantive reasonableness of the
directors’ decision (as opposed to the process by which the board
23
At the extreme, some courts view the
reached the decision).
business judgment rule as placing beyond challenge pretty much
any decision made by directors without a conflict of interest, no
matter how ill-conceived the decision, so long as the directors
thought their action was somehow in the best interest of the
24
corporation. Language in the Kamin opinion places this decision
25
in this extreme camp.
Although Kamin takes an extreme view of what a complaining
shareholder must allege in order to hold directors liable, it would
be a mistake to read the opinion as placing any disinterested board
decision beyond judicial review. To understand what limits remain
on directors’ decisions even under Kamin, it is helpful to try to
reconcile the opinion with two previous New York trial court
decisions also involving the business judgment rule.
26
Litwin v. Allen, while merely another New York trial court
while acting with reasonable skill and prudence.” Id.
22. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
23. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 996 (N.Y. 1979); see also
JONATHAN R. MACEY, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c) (1998).
24. See Schlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
25. Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976),
aff’d, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
Section 720(a)(1)(A) of the Business Corporation Law permits an
action against directors for “[t]he neglect of, or failure to perform, or
other violation of his duties in the management and disposition of
corporate assets committed to his charge.” This does not mean that a
director is chargeable with ordinary negligence for having made an
improper decision, or having acted imprudently. The “neglect”
referred to in the statute is neglect of duties (i.e., malfeasance or
nonfeasance) and not misjudgment. To allege that a director
“negligently permitted the declaration and payment” of a dividend
without alleging fraud, dishonesty or nonfeasance, is to state merely
that a decision was taken with which one disagrees.
Id.
26. 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).
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decision, helped form the understanding of the duties of directors
for an earlier generation of corporate attorneys. In its language,
the opinion in Litwin stands at the opposite extreme from Kamin as
far as the meaning of the business judgment rule. Litwin employs
language that suggests that directors, like anyone else charged with
27
breaching the duty of care, will be liable for ordinary negligence.
As later readers of the Litwin case have pointed out, however, the
28
actual facts of the case involve more than simple negligence. In
Litwin, the court held the directors of Guaranty Trust Company
29
liable for their decision to purchase $3 million of debentures.
The problem, as the court saw it, was not just that the debentures
declined in value, causing Guaranty Trust to incur a loss. Rather,
the problem with the directors’ action was that the purchase
agreement gave the seller the option to repurchase the debentures
30
at the sale price within six months.
This meant that while
Guaranty Trust faced the risk of loss if the debentures declined in
value, Guaranty Trust did not obtain the corresponding potential
for gain since, if the debentures appreciated, the seller presumably
could exercise its option to repurchase. In other words, the
directors had placed the corporation in an entirely no-win situation
in which, at best, the company would break even and, at worst, it
would suffer serious losses. This goes beyond incurring an
unreasonable risk of suffering a loss in order to seek some sort of
corporate gain.
31
In Gottfried v. Gottfried, as with Kamin, a New York trial court
confronted a challenge to the decisions of directors with respect to
32
the declaration of dividends.
In Gottfried, however, the
shareholders’ complaint was about the directors’ refusal to declare
33
Gottfried arose out of animosity between the
dividends.
shareholders of a closely held corporation—the Gottfried Baking
27. Id. at 699. “There is more here than a question of business judgment as
to which men might well differ. The directors plainly failed in this instance to
bestow the care which the situation demanded. Unless we are to do away entirely
with the doctrine that directors of a bank are liable for negligence in
administering its affairs liability should be imposed in connection with this
transaction.” Id.
28. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting the corporate
decision in Litwin was “so egregious as to amount to a no-win decision”).
29. 25 N.Y.S.2d at 691, 700.
30. Id. at 700-01.
31. 73 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1947).
32. Id. at 693-94.
33. Id.
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34

Corporation. The shareholders were the children of the founder
35
of the company and their spouses. The minority faction sued the
36
directors to compel an increase in the dividends. Through the
Depression, the company had not declared dividends on the
common stock; but with improved prospects at the end of the
Second World War, the minority shareholders claimed that the
majority had refused to declare dividends for the purpose of
starving out the minority so that the minority would sell their
37
shares.
The court held that it would uphold the directors’
decision with respect to the amount of dividends, absent a showing
that the directors acted in bad faith rather than for the
38
corporation’s welfare. Finding insufficient evidence of such bad
39
faith, the court granted a judgment for the defendants.
The evident way to reconcile Litwin, Gottfried, and Kamin is to
say that a challenged action by a corporate board of directors, at
the very least, must have for its subjective goal advancing the
interests of the corporation or the shareholders. Under Kamin’s
view, the court will not balance this goal against the cost of the
action to the corporation, as a court might do in a traditional tort
40
case.
Nevertheless, costing the corporation millions of dollars
must have some arguable utility; otherwise, it would be the
equivalent of Litwin’s no-win situation and suggestive of bad faith,
as the court warned against in Gottfried. This meant that the court
in Kamin had to find some rationale for the directors’ action.
C. Kamin As a Green Light for Earnings Management
The rationale for the directors’ action that the court accepted
in Kamin was to avoid reporting a loss in American Express’
published financial statements on American Express’ investment in
the DLJ stock, which, in turn, would have lowered the net earnings
41
Such a
reported by American Express to the investing public.
report of lower earnings, the court reasoned, could lower the price
34. Id.
35. Id. at 694.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 695.
39. Id. at 701.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947)
(laying out a formula to balance the burden of avoiding liability with the gravity
and likelihood of the resulting harm).
41. Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 811.
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at which American Express stock traded on the market, and hence
42
would be bad for the American Express shareholders. In other
words, not only was there nothing wrong with seeking to maintain
stock prices by hiding a loss, according to the court in Kamin, this
goal justified giving up $8 million in tax savings.
Rather than question this goal, the plaintiffs in Kamin made
two arguments. The first was that proper accounting, according to
the plaintiffs’ accounting experts, required American Express to
recognize the loss, even though American Express distributed,
43
rather than sold, the DLJ stock. The trial court cast this argument
aside, noting that the defendants’ accounting experts disagreed
44
with the position of the plaintiffs’ experts. In addition, the trial
court pointed out that after the chief accountant of the SEC raised
some questions about the appropriate accounting treatment of the
45
transaction, the SEC did not pursue the matter. The plaintiffs’
second argument was that four of American Express’s twenty
directors had a conflict of interest in voting for the dividend
because these four directors were officers and employees of
American Express covered by the company’s Executive Incentive
46
Compensation Plan. As such, some of the compensation of these
four directors depended upon the level of reported earnings.
Finding no showing that the four insiders had dominated or
controlled the sixteen outside directors, the trial court also rejected
47
this argument.
Looking back now, it is interesting how the two arguments of
the plaintiffs in Kamin foreshadowed the scandals of 2002. The
conflicting views of the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ accounting
experts, and the raised eyebrows (even if no ultimate action) by the
SEC, suggest that American Express was pursuing an accounting
treatment at the borderline of what was acceptable. Coupled with
this aggressive accounting approach was a compensation scheme
that gave management an incentive to report higher earnings. In
Enron and the other scandals of 2002, corporations pushed the
48
limits of acceptable accounting in search of higher reported
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
Shelley

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 812.
Id.
See Rowland, supra note 12, at 9-14 n.5; Anthony H. Catanach, Jr. &
Rhoades-Catanach, Enron: A Financial Reporting Failure?, 48 VILL. L. REV.
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earnings and higher stock prices that benefited management,
much of whose compensation was in the form of stock options and
49
the like. The plaintiffs’ attorneys in Kamin, however, may have
lost the forest in the trees. The plaintiffs’ attorneys could have
used American Express’ abandonment of $8 million in tax savings
as an opportunity to question the very goal of seeking to hide losses
and maintain higher stock prices, regardless of what accounting
practice allowed. Instead, by retaining experts to discuss the
appropriate accounting treatment, the plaintiffs implicitly
conceded the legitimacy of the goal.
II. RETHINKING KAMIN’S UNDERLYING PREMISES
ABOUT EARNING MANAGEMENT
A. The Efficient Markets Critique
A common critique of Kamin from law professors over the last
50
couple of decades is that the directors’ action was simply futile. In
a sense, the directors’ action is like the ostrich that sticks its head in
the sand to pretend there is no danger. After all, the plaintiffs in
Kamin knew about the loss American Express suffered on the
investment in the DLJ stock—otherwise, they would not have filed
the complaint. Since there is no indication that the plaintiffs had
any special access to inside information, it is unlikely that avoiding
recognizing the loss in American Express’s financial statements
kept the loss a secret. Accordingly, one might argue that the
directors’ action could have no positive effect on the price of
American Express shares (thereby suggesting the plaintiffs may
have been correct in their innuendo that the real objective was to
maintain reported earnings in order for management to receive
extra compensation).
This critique is a subset of the efficient capital markets
thinking that swept up law professors in the 1980s and 1990s.
During the last two decades, legal scholarship increasingly has
51
invoked the so-called Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis —which
1057 (2003).
49. See Gordon, supra note 6.
50. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., TEACHER’S MANUAL TO BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS
207-08 (5th ed. 2003).
51. See, e.g., Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
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is a fancy way of saying that stock prices in active trading markets
move very rapidly in response to information relevant to a stock,
and, thus, the stock’s price will incorporate the information in very
short order. One key question about the Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis is what types of information it covers. Here, the
hypothesis breaks down into three flavors. The weak form states
that the price incorporates all information one can glean from
looking at past price movements. The semi-strong form holds that
the price incorporates all publicly available information. The
strong form of the hypothesis holds that the market price
incorporates all information, including information not supposed
52
to be known outside the corporation.
Needless to say, the scandals involving Enron and the like have
cast something of a damper on this view of the world. After all, not
only did the market price of Enron stock fail to impound nonpublic information about the company’s true state (contrary to the
prediction of the strong version of the Efficient Capital Markets
Hypothesis), the price failed to impound all of the publicly
53
available warnings about the quality of Enron’s reported earnings.
As a result, the Enron experience undermines even the semi-strong
version of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis. What this
means is that the professed belief of the directors and the court in
Kamin that the stock dividend really could hide the loss from the
market and maintain the price of American Express shares may not
54
have been as naive as law professors have suggested.
B. The Legitimacy of Seeking Higher Stock Prices Through Earnings
Management
The main problem with Kamin, as brought home by the
corporate scandals of 2002, is both the court’s and the litigants’
unqualified assumption that reporting higher earnings to maintain
the trading price of American Express stock was a legitimate goal
for corporate directors. The only issue under this view is whether
52. See, e.g., R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 290-310
(4th ed. 1993).
53. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 6, at 1235-40.
54. This is not to say that the stock dividend prevented the unreported loss
on the DLJ stock from having any impact at all on the price of American Express
shares. Some market participants presumably adjusted their evaluation of
American Express to reflect their knowledge of the loss. The question is whether
the impact would have been greater had the loss shown up in the financial
statements.
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the directors had slipped the bounds of acceptable accounting
practice as a means toward achieving this goal. Even before the
scandals of 2002, some writers had questioned whether the goal of
55
hiding losses, itself, was legitimate.
One likely reason for the Kamin court’s unquestioning
acceptance of the goal of higher share prices through higher
reported earnings is this goal’s proximity to two almost universally
accepted goals for corporate directors: maximizing profits for the
56
corporation and maximizing the price at which shareholders are
57
The corporate scandals of 2002
able to sell their stock.
demonstrate, however, that there can be a significant difference
between maximizing the reported earnings and maximizing the
real earnings of a corporation. Moreover, it turns out that once we
start examining the goal of maximizing the price at which
shareholders are able to sell their stock, this objective becomes
much more problematic than typically assumed.
To begin with, there are obviously two parties involved in a
stock trade: the seller, for whom high prices are good, and the
buyer, for whom high prices are not so good. As the board seeks
higher prices for selling shareholders (who will soon not be part of
58
the corporation), one could certainly ask whether the board owes
any duty to the buyers (or prospective shareholders, who, upon
their purchase, will become part of the corporation). In fact, there
is authority suggesting that directors have a fiduciary duty toward
prospective shareholders, particularly when it comes to information
impacting the purchase of stock. For example, insider-trading
cases hold that directors and other corporate insiders have a duty
to disclose non-public material information when selling their
59
shares to parties who are not yet shareholders. Admittedly, this
disclosure duty only applies if the directors or insiders are the
persons selling their shares (since the obligation is to disclose or
60
else abstain from trading); yet, underlying this duty is the notion
that directors stand in a fiduciary relationship with prospective, and

55. See, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 4.1.2(c) n.31 (2000).
56. See, e.g., AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01(a)
(1994).
57. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
58. Using the term in the sense of a collective group, rather than a separate
legal entity. See, e.g., ALFRED F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE § 69 (1976).
59. See, e.g., Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1951).
60. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980).
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61

not just current, shareholders. What this means is that any gains
the board achieves for selling shareholders, at the expense of the
buyers who thereby become shareholders, represents a wash as far
as the interests of the parties toward whom the board owes a
fiduciary duty. Hence, all other factors being equal, the gains for
selling shareholders cannot, under the reasoning in Litwin, justify
62
imposing a cost upon the corporation.
In any event, the facts of Kamin force us to recognize that
there is also the interest of the stockholders who are not selling.
On a superficial level, even shareholders who lack immediate plans
to sell typically seem happier when the price of their shares is
higher rather than lower. On the other hand, it is an interesting
question as to whether shareholders without plans to sell would be
happier with higher share prices if they knew it was the product of
hiding losses (as in Kamin) or of other forms of earnings
management. In order to keep this essay manageable, let us ignore
considerations of real world preferences discovered by studies of
63
behavioral psychology in the economics field, and ask what would
make sense from the standpoint of non-selling shareholders.
A recent paper by a trio of business professors argues that
earnings management might be in the economic interest of the
64
existing shareholders. The thesis is that earnings management
can prevent inefficient meddling by owners in decisions better left
to managers. Specifically, without earnings management, owners
might overreact to short-term poor performance. Fear of such
overreaction, in turn, could lead to suboptimal decisions by
managers who might, for example, forgo potentially better
61. Id. at n.8 (basing the duty to disclose or abstain on a fiduciary relationship
between parties to the trade, and applying this concept to insiders selling to
purchasers who thereby will become shareholders).
62. There is no conflict between this conclusion and the repeated judicial
holdings imposing a duty on directors to seek the highest price for selling
shareholders in transactions involving sale of control. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985). In these cases,
the buyer has an advantage over the selling shareholders who face a collective
action problem in negotiating for the highest price. Hence, the board’s
intervention is appropriate to level the playing field between the purchaser and
the selling shareholders, even if the intervention imposes a cost on the
corporation.
63. See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 2000).
64. ANIL ARYA ET AL., ARE UNMANAGED EARNINGS ALWAYS BETTER FOR
SHAREHOLDERS? (Yale ICF, Working Paper No. 02-37, Aug. 2002), at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=322260 (last visited Apr. 19,
2004).
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investment decisions in favor of decisions that assure at least
acceptable short-term results. This is an interesting theory. Yet,
reality seems very different. In contrast to the well-documented
65
antics of the owner of the New York Yankees baseball team, it is
difficult to find much empirical evidence that owners (or directors)
of publicly held corporations are quick to interfere with managers
66
whenever such corporations report poor earnings results.
In contrast to its uncertain advantages, using earnings
management to maintain higher share prices might produce a
couple of concrete disadvantages to non-selling shareholders.
Kamin illustrates the first obvious disadvantage. The corporation
65. See Trouble in Paradise as Torre, Steinbrenner Fight, WICHITA EAGLE, Apr. 22,
2003, at 3D.
66. Indeed, it has been well accepted in corporate law literature since the
classic work by Professors Berle and Means (ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C.
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)) that
shareholders in the publicly held corporation are “rationally apathetic” and will
not interfere with management. See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 55, at 230, § 3.1.5.a.
Moreover, despite some relatively recent instances of boards sacking
underperforming CEOs, as a general proposition directors also have been slow to
second-guess management based upon short-term poor results. See, e.g., id.; see also
The Way We Govern Now, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2003, at 59 (discussing poor
board governance in light of corporate scandals involving Enron); MICHAEL C.
JENSEN & JOSEPH FULLER, WHAT’S A DIRECTOR TO DO? (Harv. NOM, Working Paper
No. 02-38, Oct. 2002), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=357722 (last visited Apr. 19, 2004) (“The recent wave of corporate scandals
provides continuing evidence that boards have failed to fulfill their role as the toplevel corporate control mechanism.”). Of course, poor earnings and poor market
performance might endanger management by making the corporation a target for
a hostile takeover. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 265-66 (1977). Yet, takeover
defenses, such as poison pills and staggered boards, increasingly have blunted this
threat. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered
Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 889 (2002). Moreover, it
seems that takeovers result from a sustained period of poor earnings and poor
market performance rather than the sort of short-term poor performance
addressed by Professors Arya, Clover and Sunder. Arya, supra note 64. Cf., Melvin
A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1497-98
(1989) (noting that large effects on stock price are necessary to trigger a takeover
because of the substantial premiums involved).
Higher share prices might provide a second possible benefit to non-selling
shareholders if the shareholders use their stock as collateral for loans. This
benefit can dissipate, however, if share prices decline in the future (which, as
discussed below, is a danger with earnings management). In this event, the loan
agreement might require the posting of additional security, as can occur when a
decline in stock prices produces a margin call on stock used as collateral for a loan
used to finance the purchase of stock. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 221.3, 221.8 (limiting
borrowing to buy stock on margin to a percentage of the value of the stock
securing the loan).
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may end up paying more taxes as a result of seeking higher
reported earnings. Admittedly, corporations often are able to
avoid this disadvantage insofar as the law allows inconsistent
accounting treatment in tax returns and public financial
67
reporting. Nevertheless, a recent study of firms that restated their
publicly reported income during the years 1996 to 2002 found
these companies paid more than $300 million in taxes on income
68
they subsequently conceded they did not make.
A second disadvantage for the non-selling shareholders from
earnings management is the danger that the corporation may face
liability for securities fraud. As noted by Judge Friendly, corporate
liability in securities fraud lawsuits effectively means taking money
from the existing shareholders of the corporation to pay injured
69
traders.
Of course, the court in Kamin did not hold that the
business judgment rule would protect directors whose efforts at
earnings management reached the point of constituting a knowing
misrepresentation of material fact. Yet to suggest, as seems to be
the bottom line in Kamin, that the business judgment rule protects
all efforts to manipulate accounting in order to report the largest
possible earnings so long as the SEC does not find fraud,
underestimates the danger of such a regime from the standpoint of
the interest of non-selling shareholders. The problem is that
earnings management often operates in a gray area between
70
straightforward reporting and outright fraud. Operating in this
gray area creates the risk that the corporation will incur liability if
the corporate officials misjudge what a finder of fact later decides
was acceptable, or, even without an adjudication of liability, the risk
that the corporation will incur the costs of litigation and possibly
71
settlement.
67. See George K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a
Lesson from History, 54 SMU L. REV. 209 (2001).
68. Merle Erickson et al., How Much Will Firms Pay for Earnings that Do Not
Exist? Evidence of Taxes Paid on Allegedly Fraudulent Earnings (Oct. 2002), at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=347420 (last visited Apr. 19,
2004).
69. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Friendly, J., concurring).
70. See Rowland, supra note 12, at 169 n.5 (internal quotations omitted).
71. Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act passed by Congress in 1995
make it easier for corporations to avoid lengthy litigation of securities fraud claims
when the merits are uncertain, most particularly by imposing heightened pleading
requirements. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2004); In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec.
Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999) (dismissing a fraud class-action claim for
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Since almost all shareholders sell eventually, it is also
appropriate to consider the impact of earnings management upon
shareholders who sell a significant time after the corporation has
reported higher “managed” earnings. Earnings management often
has a sort of “robbing-Peter-to-pay-Paul” effect as far as future
earnings reports. So, to use a simple example, the crude earnings
management technique of seeking at the end of an accounting
72
period to delay expenses and accelerate receipts so as to show
higher reported income for the period (be it a year or a quarter),
means less income and more expense reported for the next
period—presumably to the detriment of shareholders who sell after
the next period. Indeed, this “robbing-Peter-to-pay-Paul” aspect of
earnings management can create a snowball effect, as illustrated by
the recent corporate scandals. Unless real earnings substantially
increase, management must use ever more aggressive earnings
management techniques just to pull reported earnings out of the
hole dug by the prior use of earnings management, not to mention
73
meeting market demands for reporting ever-increasing earnings.
The end result in companies like Enron and WorldCom was a
collapse of stock prices to the detriment of stockholders who had
74
held their shares and sought to sell too late.
defective and insufficient pleadings). This, however, does not eliminate all threat
of suit. See EP Medsystems, Inc. v. EchoCath, Inc., 235 F.3d 865 (3d Cir. 2000)
(upholding complaint under Rule 10b-5 as meeting the heightened pleading
standard).
72. Managers might accelerate receipts by adopting sales incentives that
encourage their customers to move forward purchases that the customers will
make anyway (so-called “channel stuffing”). See ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE
STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA DON’T WANT YOU TO KNOW
163 (2002).
73. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 1, at 933-34.
74. See Robert Frank et al., Scandal Scorecard, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at B1
(detailing stock price declines at Enron and other corporations involved in
scandals of 2002).
This discussion of earnings management is oversimplified insofar as it presupposes
the use of earnings management always to report the highest possible income for
any given accounting period—which creates the “robbing-Peter-to-pay-Paul”
problem of simply putting off the Day of Judgment. By contrast, in the technique
referred to as a “big bath,” management reports a major one-time loss, instead of
gradually reporting increased expenses spread over a period of time in the future.
Id. The notion is that investors will ignore one-time losses as aberrational. See
Rowland, supra note 12, at 172 n.14. (Interestingly, this view of investor
psychology is quite different than taken by the directors and the court in Kamin).
Moreover, up until the market of the 1990s, it appeared that corporate officials
often used earnings management to level out reported income. In other words,
corporate officials manipulated accounting to avoid overly good showings in fat
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All told, the court in Kamin was mistaken in its assumption that
the interests of American Express’s shareholders justified
transactions designed solely to maximize reported earnings. The
interests of trading shareholders (buyers and sellers) wash out, and
maximizing reported (rather than real) earnings does not
75
generally further the interests of non-trading shareholders. This
years, as well as to improve reported earnings in lean years. See Coffee, supra note
9, at 11. For example, a corporation might lower reported earnings during a
particularly good quarter by charging, as an added expense, increased funding of
so-called “cookie-cutter reserves.” The corporation then could reduce such
reserves in order to improve net income reported in a poor quarter. See Rowland,
supra note 12, at 172 n.14.
A full exploration of the impact of these sorts of techniques on the interests of
shareholders is getting a bit beyond the scope of this short essay. To begin with,
the impact is subtler than with earnings management that simply seeks to
maximize reported earnings. For instance, smoothing reported earnings might
improve share prices over the long term because investors discount the price they
are willing to pay depending on the volatility of earnings. (Greater volatility
means greater risk, which, in turn, leads rational investors to demand a greater
return. See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 570-71 (3d ed. 2001)).
Moreover, managers might argue that there is no inherent reason why smoothing
of reported earnings, and resulting higher share prices, cannot continue
indefinitely. The danger, however, arises from the fact that investors are looking
at past earnings volatility in order to gauge future risk. So long as future earnings
volatility (as massaged through earnings management) does not exceed the past,
there is no harm, just as there is no harm to going without fire insurance so long
as there is no fire. The comeuppance occurs if the corporation suffers a
particularly bad period of earnings. In this event, the stock price presumably will
go down, not only to reflect the decreased earnings, but also to reflect a
reassessment of the riskiness of holding the stock. This decrease in price obviously
harms purchasers who overpaid because earnings management caused them to
underestimate the riskiness of the stock. Moreover, having been burned, investors
might further discount the stock to reflect the risk that, due to earnings
management, they still are misjudging the risk.
Returning our focus to Kamin, however, the green light given to earnings
management by the court seems to ignore any distinction between smoothing
earnings and seeking to maximize earnings. Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 815. In fact,
because of the one-time nature of the loss suffered by American Express on the
DLJ stock, the goal of maximizing reported earnings may have coincided with the
goal of smoothing out fluctuations in reported earnings. Yet, the court never
draws any attention either to this fact or to its implications as far as permissible
earnings management. Id. In any event, the corporate scandals of 2002 seem to
have been symptomatic of a shift in the use of earnings management from a device
to smooth out reported income, to a device to show ever-growing income. See
Coffee, supra note 9, at 11.
75. For a different analysis of whether earnings management is in the
interests of shareholders (focusing on the investment strategies of so-called “right
side” and “left side” shareholders, and finding that earnings management is never
in the interest of “right side” shareholders and not in the ultimate interest of “left
side” shareholders) see William Bratton, Shareholder Value, Financial Conservatism,
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does not mean that every accounting choice that results in higher
reported earnings than another choice breaches the directors’
duty. If the choice does not impose a significant cost on the
corporation (such as the $8 million of tax savings lost in Kamin),
then the choice represents a functional nil set. This analysis does
mean, however, that the desire simply to report (rather than to
achieve) higher earnings cannot justify incurring significant costs
for the corporation.
III. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this essay is not to argue that shareholder
derivative lawsuits asserting state law fiduciary duty claims are the
answer to earnings management. Kamin was a fairly rare case in
that the directors’ efforts to pump up reported earnings entailed
an immediate, large, and concrete cost upon the corporation. This
substantial negative impact upon the corporation, in turn, forced
the directors to be candid about their motive and confronted the
court with the need to assess the legitimacy of the directors’ goal.
The significance of the court’s acceptance of the directors’ goal lay
not in closing off future state law shareholders’ derivative claims,
since earnings management normally will not impose the sort of
cost upon the corporation that would prompt a state law
shareholder derivative lawsuit. Rather, the significance of the
decision in Kamin was the unfortunate message that it sent to
future corporate management and their attorneys. To the extent
that judicial pronouncements have an impact independent of
creating or precluding liability because of the norms such
76
pronouncements establish, then the court’s decision in Kamin can
take some responsibility for the corporate scandals of 2002.
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Auditor
Independence
(Oct.
10,
2003),
at
http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=454080 (last visited Apr. 19, 2004).
76. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness and the
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1793-95 (2001).
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